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RECENT CASES
discrimination transcends the requirements of due process.80 To
incur censure under the Fifth Amendment, the legislative classifi-
cation must be arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory.3 1 The
reasonableness test espoused in Perez3 and postulated in Schneider-3
is, "Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated
to affect [sic] the end that is within the power of Congress to
achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our
foreign relations . . .?" Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the
majority, answered in the negative, observing that the statute
proceeds upon the impermissible assumption that naturalized citizens
as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance to this country
than do the native-born,34 and the legislative intent did not demon-
strate a valid exercise of congressional authority.
3 5
Considering the present membership of the Supreme Court, there
appears little doubt but that denationalization legislation will en-
counter rigorous opposition. Three Justices are committed to the
position that congressional authority to denationalize is nonexistent
absent expatriation by the voluntary renunciation of nationality and
allegiance. 36 It may well be anticipated that this minority will
muster the requisite support to defeat attempted denationalization
from the veritable arsenal available in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution which have been successfully




CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-MISTAKE OF AGE AS A D E F E N S E-
The defendant was charged with statutory rape of a minor seventeen
years and nine months of age. The defendant offered evidence to
show his lack of criminal intent due to a reasonable and substantial
belief that she was eighteen years of age or older, the age of legal
consent. This evidence was not admitted and the defendant was
found guilty in Superior Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
California held, the defendant's reasonable belief that the prosecutrix
30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Accord, Hirabayashi v. United
States, supra note 28.
31. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
32. 856 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).
33. 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1189 (1964).
34. Id. at 1190.
35. Id. at 1189.
36. See Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent In Perez at 68-69; Mr. Justice Douglas'
dissent in Perez at 83-84; and Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion in Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) at 138-39.
37. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Court struck down a
provision which asserted automatic expatriation for evading military service, declaring
that it was penal in nature and would inflict severe punishment without due process of
law and without the safeguards which must attend a criminal prosecution under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. And in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), a denationaliza-
tion provision for desertion was found penal and violative of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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had reached the age of consent could prove a lack of criminal intent
constituting a complete defense. People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr.
361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
To prevent the degradation of morals, society has developed
the legal fiction of statutory rape,' based on the theory that below
a certain age the female does not have the ability to consent to
sexual intercourse2 because she neither understands the nature
of her acts nor the consequences thereof.3 Common law set the
age of consent at puberty,4 but state legislatures have increased it
to as high as twenty-one. 5
All American jurisdictions have statutory rape legislation, and
the majority make it a strict liability crime.6 The Hernandez
decision is the first to hold that mistake of fact is a complete
defense to this crime; this defense has been provided by legislation
in Illinois7 and New Mexico." New Mexico allows the defense
when the victim is thirteen to sixteen years of age but imposes
strict liability if the female is below thirteen;9 Illinois gives the
prosecutor a choice of charging statutory rape as a felony, 0 in
which case mistake is a defense, or of charging statutory rape as
a misdemeanor for which the defendant is strictly liable.1 The
American Law Institute has adopted the latter policy regarding
mistake of age.1
2
The California court reasoned that intent should be a necessary
element of statutory rape, therefore there could be no crime
when intent was negated by a mistake of fact. This appears contrary
to the general rule that the only intent necessary is intent to do the
act declared wrongful, not intent to commit a crime.' 3 But California
has no fornication statute, thus the act could only be wrongful as a
violation of the rape statute.14  The court, however, made no
mention of the general rule or of the lack of a fornication statute,
1. People V. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911) ; Ledbetter v. State,
187 Tenn. 396, 99 S.W.2d 112 (1947); State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448
(1949).
2. Propes v. State, 68 Ga. App. 418, 23 S.E.2d 98 (1942); State v. McCall, 245 Iowa
991, 63 N.W.2d 874 (1954); State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 494, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947).
3. People V. Hernandez, 39 CaL Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
4. United States v. Jacobs, 113 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Wis. 1953).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3706 (1956).
6. E.g., Miller v. State, 16 Ala. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918); Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d
669 (Alaska 1963); State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892).
7. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 11-4, 5 (Smith-Hurd. 1964).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. J 40A-9-3, 4 (Supp. 1964).
9. Ibid.10. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 11-4 (Smith-Hurd. 1964).
11. Id. at § 11-5. See Bowman, Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT., vol. 38, page
598, 628 (1961). The commentator points out that to be consistent with the policy of
preventing under age sexual activities, this misdemeanor charge is always available
despite a mistake of fact, while at the same time, the harshness of a felony charge isalleviated in cases where extenuating circumstances are involved.
12. MODERN PENAL CODE 8 213.6, comment (Tent Draft No. 13, 1962).
13. Cf. Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941) ;Watkins v. District of
Columbia. 60 A.2d 227 (D.C. 1948); Balark v. State, 81 Ga. App. 649, 59 S.E.2d 524(1950); See generally, PER{KINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 639 (1957).
14. North Dakota has a fornication statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-08 (1960),
therefore the accused always intends to do a wrongful act.
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thus it would seem that the decision is broadly based on a trend
away from strict liability felonies.15
California appears to be a leader in the movement requiring a
criminal intent for felonies, such as bigamy's and possession of
narcotics,'17 generally declared by the majority to be strict liability
offenses.' s This movement limits strict liability to minor offenses
such as police regulations which are misdemeanors, 19 and eliminates
strict liability felonies20 unless there is a legislative intent to the
contrary.2'
It seems that legislation is a better method for establishing the
California rule. The legislatures can provide a flexible statutory
scheme to deal effectively and equitably with variable fact situations,
while the courts, like California, may have to eliminate statutory
rape entirely if they are to change the law.
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15. See generally, HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 157-168 (1957).
16. People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
17. People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956).
18. State v. Braun, 230 Md. 82, 185 A.2d 905 (1962) (bigamy); State v. Goonan,
89 N.H. 528, 3 A.2d 105 (1938) (bigamy) ; See generally, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 70 (1957) ;
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (narcotics) ; Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70,
137 A.2d 115 (1957) (narcotics).
19. Supra note 16, at 853 n. 2; See generally, Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
20. See Wallace v. State, 77 Nev. 123, 359 P.2d 749 (1961) ; State v. Geddlng, 67
N.M. 87, 352 P.2d 1003 (1960) ; See generally, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 70 (1957).
21. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
